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If the Georgian government had scripted recent events in Abkhazia, and between 
Abkhazia and Vanuatu, it could not have gotten a better outcome than what has actually 
occurred.  Vanuatu, a tiny Pacific Island state briefly recognized, or almost briefly 
recognized, Abkhazia in the beginning of June.  Almost immediately after the 
announcement of the recognition there were rumors that the government of Vanuatu was 
back tracking as Vanuatu’s Ambassador to the UN claimed to know nothing of the 
recognition.  Georgia, of course, has continued to maintain that Abkhazia is part of 
Georgia.  This view is supported by the U.S., the European Union and most of the world. 
This week, less than a month after the initial announcement by the de facto Abkhaz 
government that Vanuatu was recognizing them, Vanuatu officially withdrew their 
recognition, likely putting an end to the story.  The reasons for the withdrawal of 
recognition are not clear, but are likely due either to a change of government in Vanuatu, 
pressure on Vanuatu from Georgia’s allies, most notably the U.S., or the incompetence of 
the Abkhaz leadership. 
Vanuatu’s withdrawal of recognition is a huge victory for Georgia for several 
reasons.  The first and most obvious reason is that it does not add another country to the 
paltry list of countries, currently including Russia, Nicaragua, Nauru and Venezuela, 
which recognize Abkhazia.  Had Vanuatu recognized Abkhazia, despite its small size and 
relative obscurity, it still would have been something of a victory for Abkhazia.  Second, 
Vanuatu’s decision to not recognize Abkhazia raises the possibility that Georgia’s allies 
are willing to be very active in supporting Georgia’s position on Abkhazia.  It is not 
known, but cannot be precluded, that following the recognition announcement the U.S. 
cajoled or threatened Vanuatu eventually leading that country’s leaders to change their 
initial decision. 
A third reason this is good for Georgia is that Abkhazia’s mishandling of the situation 
shows the Abkhaz leadership to be amateurish, even bumbling.  Countries, or in the case 
of Abkhazia, aspiring countries, that make announcements that they have won 
recognition from another country only to have the recognizing country challenge that 
assertion are hard to take seriously.  This kind of behavior undermines the Abkhaz claim 
that it is ready for statehood.  It is not clear whether Vanuatu recognized Abkhazia and 
changed its mind, or never recognized Abkhazia at all, but the events themselves matter 
less than the perception.  Had the recognition been real, opponents of Abkhazia would 
assert that Abkhazia can only win recognition from tiny irrelevant countries like Vanuatu 
and Nauru.  Now opponents of Abkhaz independence can assert that Abkhazia can’t even 
get it right when it seeks recognition from small and irrelevant countries.  Lastly, the 
withdrawal of recognition suggests that recognition may not move only in one 
direction.  If Vanuatu changed its mind, one might ask, isn’t it possible that Nauru, or 
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some other future small country which might decide to recognize Abkhazia, could cancel 
that recognition if given the right incentives? 
This episode regarding Vanuatu puts some immediate pressure on Abkhazia to get 
recognition from somewhere to demonstrate that Abkhaz aspirations for independence 
are still moving forward.  If Abkhazia fails to do this, the mishandling of the Vanuatu 
recognition will begin to define Abkhaz diplomacy creating a storyline that is very bad 
for Abkhazia and allow Georgia to continue to present Abkhaz independence as 
something which cannot be taken seriously. 
Importantly, other than the impact it has on perceptions, this episode may have little 
effect on the bigger picture issues regarding Georgia and Abkhazia.  Russian troops will 
not leave Abkhazia; the Abkhaz will not decide they want to reconcile with Georgia; 
European or American policy will not change substantially.  In short, the status quo will 
continue, so Russian influence will grow in Abkhazia, Georgia will find itself with 
increasingly fewer tools at its disposal and western powers will continue to have no 
relationships or soft power to leverage with Abkhazia.  One of the losers in that scenario 
will be Georgia, despite the diplomatic victory it is now enjoying. 
